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next, with some parties from opposing ends of the ideological spectrum competing for and winning support from the same groups of voters. As a result of this party competition, the definitions of left and right become blurred, leading the effects of social group identities on political behaviour to appear at some times, but not others.
In order to test this argument, I examine the religious-secular cleavage in Romania, a country in which the effects of social group identities do not appear as clearly as elsewhere in CEE (e.g. McAllister and White, 2007, Figure 3 ) or as stable. The analyses below examine whether religiosity is associated with left-right self-placement, whether religiosity shapes party perceptions (and whether, in turn, these perceptions shape left-right self-placements), and whether party perceptions and left-right self-placements affect the degree to which religious individuals vote as a bloc. The results demonstrate the powerful impact that parties can have on the appearance of cleavage-based behaviour. In the results below, shifts in party stances on religious issues have persuaded some religious voters, affecting their perceptions of the party on a left-right scale, which in turn affect their own self-placements on that same scale. By extension, this change in self-placement and the larger blurring of the definitions of left and right created by multiple parties pursuing the same base of religious voters explains the instability of religiosity effects on left-right self-placements over time. Furthermore, by demonstrating that the positions taken by party elites affect the formation and stability of cleavage-based effects on political behaviour, these results also explain why some cleavages are visible in certain countries, but not others.
Voters, Party Agency, and the Appearance of Cleavage Effects
Many studies of cleavages in the period immediately following the collapse of Communism predicted that stable cleavages would not form in CEE (Körösényi, 1991; Lewis, 1993; Lipset, 1994) . In its broadest sense, this tabula rasa hypothesis held that people in the new democracies of CEE began their roles as voters without preconceived political ideologies, partisan preferences, or conscious social identities; as a result, social divisions like religion and class would not transform into partisan attachments. Scholars supporting the tabula rasa hypothesis pointed to the absence of party identifications among large portions of the electorate as evidence of their claims (see White, Rose, and McAllister, 1997; Miller, White, and Heywood, 1998; Rose and Mishler, 1998 ).
Yet evidence has emerged suggesting that social cleavages have strong effects on vote preferences for particular party families in several countries in CEE (Evans and Whitefield, 1995, 1998; Shabad and Slomczynski, 1999; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Vlachová, 2001; Tworzecki, 2003) . While most of these studies have focused on class cleavages, the studies exploring the effects of religiosity have found that religious voters in these countries vote as distinctive blocs for the parties most associated with religious issues (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Shabad and Slomczynski, 1999; White et al., 2000; Tworzecki, 2003) , much like the religious-secular divide in Western Europe (Broughton and ten Napel, 2000; Elff, 2007) . In many (though not all) CEE countries, religiosity also maps onto the left-right spectrum (McAllister and White, 2007) as it does in advanced industrial democracies (Knutsen, 1995; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Freire, 2006) . Even in those countries where cleavages like class once appeared absent, such cleavages have developed and stabilized over time (e.g. Hlousek and Kopecek, 2008 ; see also Colton, 2011) . The appearance of cleavages has occurred in part because considerable 'political learning' has occurred, whereby voters have gradually acquired enough information about parties' positions to begin voting along cleavage lines (Evans and Whitefield, 2006) . Thus, a considerable body of work concludes that the social cleavage approach as applied to the party systems of Western Europe can be applied to many of the party systems in CEE (see the reviews in Whitefield, 2002; Evans, 2006; Enyedi, 2008) .
The findings of cleavage effects in some countries suggests that the tabula rasa hypothesis incorrectly attributes the appearance or absence of social cleavage effects to an electorate that is inexperienced with elections and recognising social cues. Instead, it is party elites who do not divide clearly along cleavage lines in those countries where religious and other cleavages appear absent among voters. In some CEE countries, party elites are divided along religious-secular lines much like voters (Kitschelt et al., 1999) . Evidence from other countries, however, suggests that elites have not polarised clearly along religious-secular and other cleavage lines (e.g., White, Rose and McAllister, 1997, pp. 65; Kitschelt et al., 1999) . Without clear divisions among elites, identifying which party is most representative of the issues that religious voters care about (and political learning- Evans and Whitefield, 2006) would become difficult.
Party identifiability is compounded in many countries by two related factors: weak parties and electoral volatility. In many parts of CEE, parties are programmatically weak 1 and are often focused around a charismatic individual (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Whitefield, 2002, pp. 193; Sakwa, 2003; Evans, 2006, pp. 258-259; Hlousek and Kopecek, 2008) . These parties have made little effort to establish durable party identifications among voters (Cirtautas, 1994; White, Rose and McAllister, 1997; Tworzecki, 2003, pp. 198 ). This has resulted in parties that are often without ideological coherence and/or stable constituencies. These weak political parties have, in turn, led to high electoral volatility (Tavits, 2005 (Tavits, , 2008b Lewis, 2006; Epperly, 2011) , with many parties competing in only one or two elections (Sikk, 2005) . Such weakly defined parties and high electoral volatility have made the identification of religiously-oriented parties difficult.
In keeping with previous research noting the weakness and instability of parties in CEE, I
argue that the reason for the appearance or absence of social group effects on political behaviour is due to competition among party elites to represent the same coveted groups of voters. This is particularly the case for the religious-secular cleavage. In a region where religious commitment is strong or experiencing revival (Froese, 2001; Greeley, 2003) , there is intense competition among parties of both the left and right in some countries for the majority of voters who are concerned to some degree with religious issues. Some parties not originally targeting these voters have even switched their positions on religion over time so as to win religious voters' support. With several parties competing for religious voters' loyalties, the result of such a congested electoral space is that the definitions of left and right can become blurred and individuals have a difficult time sorting out which party(ies) best represent(s) religious (or secular) issues. When multiple parties compete to persuade certain groups of voters that they best represent a particular group's interests (such as religious issues) religious and other social group effects on political behaviour may appear absent-particularly when the definitions of left and right are unclear.
This argument accords with the literature stressing the agency of parties in aggregating interests and social groups, determining the issue and ideological content of elections (which includes such things as giving definition to the terms left and right), and ultimately in shaping the formation of cleavages (Schattschneider, 1960; Sartori, 1969; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Enyedi, 2005; Evans, 2006, pp. 246) . According to this 'topdown' approach, the appearance of cleavage effects is determined by party elites who activate social identities, turning these social identities into political identities when such groups meet with their electoral interests. This perspective is reinforced by what we know about individuals' responses to elite cues (Popkin, 1991; Zaller, 1992; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998 ) and the importance of parties' policy positions to individuals' vote choices (Tavits, 2008a; Elff, 2009) .
Admittedly, such an understanding of cleavages differs from foundational works in the study of social cleavages (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Bartolini and Mair, 1990) ; however, this understanding is in keeping with newer perspectives that emphasize group-specific party appeals and group-specific political behaviour as being the fundamental aspects of cleavage politics, even if the behaviour of elites and/or voters changes over time (Enyedi, 2008) . While an alternative approach views changes in cleavage effects as originating in changes to the social structure, and while changes in the cleavage structure may lead parties to change their strategies (the 'bottom-up' approach: see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1970; Rose, 1974; Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma, 2007) , shifts in support for one party to another can only be explained by shifts in party elites' positions on such issues, as well as their campaign efforts to win these groups of voters' support. Without such party competition, religiosity effects would appear stable from one election to the next.
The top-down perspective has recently been applied in other contexts in order to explain changes in the cleavage patterns in those countries. For instance, Enyedi (2005) documents the ability of parties to transform their social bases of support with the example of Fidesz, which is an anti-Communist party that switched from an anti-clerical party of the left to a pro-family party of the right so that the party could form a government with parties of the right instead of a government consisting of parties belonging to the left. Examining the case of Chile, Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) show how the parties of the centre-left coalition (Concertación) have articulated a democracy-authoritarianism cleavage in order to defeat the party heirs to the Pinochet regime. Raymond and Arce (2011) show how the absence of an indigenous cleavage for many years in Peru (which has a large indigenous population) was due to the absence of parties articulating indigenous issues. In reviewing the extensive literature on cleavage effects and party dealignment in Western Europe, Enyedi (2008, pp. 296) notes that much of the dealignment phenomenon is due to shifts in the parties' strategies and less to the declining relevance of social identities (see also Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Elff, 2009) . Readers familiar with the American political scene will recognise the evolution of racial issues (which began with elite articulation and later spread to the mass public, influencing voters' perceptions of the parties) as an example demonstrating top-down effects leading to the appearance of cleavage-like effects (Carmines and Stimson, 1989 ).
All of these works demonstrate that in defining the issue and ideological content of elections and making electoral appeals rooted in social group interests, parties are able to encourage (or prevent) the formation of political identities giving rise to cleavage-based effects on political behaviour. What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which parties are able to shape the formation of cleavages. It could be that, in shaping the formation of cleavages, The reason parties on both sides of the ideological spectrum compete for support among religious voters is because religion features prominently in Romanian society. Similar to other countries in CEE, religious institutions in Romania outlived Communism and continue to thrive in its wake (Ramet, 1995; Wittenberg, 2006) . Although subservient under Communism, Church leaders have played an active role in Romanian politics since democratisation, promoting the Church as the embodiment of Romanian national identity (Stan and Turcescu, 2000) , similar to the practise in other Orthodox countries (Enyedi, 2003; Mavrogordatos, 2003) . With such an active clergy, and because most Romanians belong to the Romanian Orthodox Church, politicians are eager to cater to religious voters. Parties will often employ religious and national symbols and attempt to remain favourable within the eyes of the church by stating their support for the Church's self-defined role in society Turcescu and Stan, 2005) .
Unlike countries such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, however-which have stable policy dimensions with clearly defined policy spaces for moral traditionalism and other issues of import to religious voters (Kitschelt et al., 1999 )-religious issues have not been 'owned' (Petrocik, 1996) by any one particular political party, as Orthodoxy creates the political space in which parties of both the left and right are able to compete effectively for religious individuals' support and many parties realise they must adopt stances that do not offend all religious voters in order to remain electorally viable. Such competition for religious voters' support from both the right and the left has been facilitated by the weak development of the parties' issue and ideological profiles relative to parties in Western Europe. This weak party development has further led parties of both the left and right to compete on religious issues (as part of the larger cultural issue axis) to win the support of religious voters.
In some sense then, with such a lack of policy consensus, the terms left and right may represent views towards the parties more than specific ideologies. When surveyed, most
Romanians are able to locate themselves on a left-right scale; however, with such vague definitions of left and right, and with partisan competition for religious voters' support from both sides of the ideological spectrum, the ideological self-placements of individuals may be distorted by party competition. Because of this competition and blurring of the definitions of left and right, individuals' left-right self-placements and their perceptions of the parties on a left-right scale might follow elite patterns of political competition, with individuals identifying themselves on the same side of the left-right scale as the party they perceive to be representative of the issues with which they are most concerned. As a result, the religious-secular cleavage might not appear as clearly as in advanced industrial democracies.
Thus, with the overlapping issue and ideological content of electoral politics, Romania appears as an unlikely case for the appearance of religious-secular effects on political behaviour.
However, with evidence suggesting that religious issues are contested to some degree by most parties, there may in fact be a religious-secular divide in Romania that is masked by political competition by parties on both sides of the blurred ideological spectrum. The next three sections seek to determine whether religiosity affects political behaviour in Romania and whether parties have affected the appearance or absence of this political divide.
The Effect of Religiosity on Left-Right Self-Placement over Time
The first analysis examines whether there is evidence of a stable religious-secular cleavage over time when looking at left-right self-placements. however, while the government led by the Christian-Democratic PNT-CD came into controversy over its plans to return lands confiscated from the Greek Catholic Church under Communism (some of which had been given to the Romanian Orthodox Church), PSD was able to capitalize on the issue by reminding the Orthodox Church and its many followers of the party's record of support for the Church in the years since democratisation (Stan and Turcescu, 2000) .
Additionally, to cope with challenges by the nationalist Greater Romania Party, PSD ramped up its nationalistic rhetoric, which included references to the traditions and beliefs identified with Romanian Orthodoxy, as well as general references to religious themes and traditional morality. Thus, in the years following that 1996 defeat, PSD has made a conscious effort to appear more traditionalist in its social values stances and less hostile to religion . Such shifts on the part of PSD have likely had significant effects on voters' perceptions of the parties, making PSD appear as a more viable contender among religious voters. While not featuring as prominently in the campaign as economic issues, the fact that issues of religion were discussed actively by the parties attests to the importance of winning this base of voters as perceived by party elites, who in turn sought to win this base of voters by providing cues to demonstrate that the party shared religious voters' values. 10 The efforts by PSD are very similar to the ways in which American political parties have contested the sort of cultural issues generally thought to be secondary to economic issues (Leege et al., 2002) .
11 Table 2 
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These efforts by PSD to court religious voters seem to have paid off. Table 2 error terms into the parameter estimates, seemingly unrelated regression addresses the simultaneity problems that arise from estimating each model separately.
Table 3 about here
The first striking findings in Table 3 Left-right self-placement also has a positive effect on perceptions of PSD, indicating that those placing themselves to the right perceive the party as belonging to the right (and vice versa for those placing themselves to the left). In 1996, left-right self-placements have no effect on perceptions of PSD, while these perceptions similarly have no effect on left-right selfplacements. The fact that party perceptions and self-placements influence one another in 2004
and not in 1996 is in keeping with the argument above. As PSD shifted its electoral strategy to target religious voters, some voters took notice and shifted their perceptions of the party and/or shifted their self-placements to reflect the new positions adopted by PSD on religious and nationality issues. 
The Effect of Religiosity on Vote Choice
The analysis thus far has examined factors that ultimately should affect vote choices.
This section examines whether the efforts of parties like PSD, whose effects on perceptions of the party and left-right self-placement were observed in Table 3 , have actually affected vote choices. Specifically, I examine respondents' vote choices for the lower house (Chamber of Deputies), focusing primarily on the two major electoral blocs: the coalition parties of the right formed by PNT-CD in 1996 and PNL in 2004 (coded zero) versus PSD and it electoral allies (coded one). 15 The same control variables used in Table 3 are included. While this ignores some of the parties in a complex multiparty system, most of the partisan discussion of religious issues has been between these two electoral blocs.
16 Table 4 about here Table 4 To determine the impact that efforts by PSD to win religious voters' support have had, model 2 adds left-right self-placements, while model 3 controls for left-right perceptions of PSD.
Despite possible endogeneity problems (evident in Table 3 In keeping with the argument put forth here, these findings demonstrate that PSD's efforts to alter religious individuals' perceptions of the party-and the effect these perceptions have had on individuals' own self-placements-have altered the appearance of the religious-secular cleavage on vote choices. While religious voters continue to vote for the parties of the right, these effects are mediated by perceptions of PSD and their effects on left-right self-placements, both of which increasingly mask the appearance of a religious-secular divide (in keeping with the findings from Table 3 ). These findings, in turn, provide further evidence of the effects that parties like PSD have had on the appearance of such religious-secular divisions: not only has PSD altered both left-right perceptions of the party and individuals' own left-right selfplacements, but these have, in turn, increased support for PSD among religious voters.
Conclusions
The findings presented here have clear implications for the literature regarding the agency of political parties in shaping the formation of cleavages, as well as the literature regarding the appearance and stability of cleavage effects. Similar to previous research from the top-down perspective of cleavage formation and maintenance (Schattschneider, 1960; Sartori, 1969; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Enyedi, 2005; Evans, 2006, pp. 246; Raymond and Arce, 2011) The results presented here appear generalisable, not only to the larger post-Communist region, but cross-nationally as well. Many CEE countries experience similar instability among party elites; based on the arguments and analysis performed here, party actions seem to explain why these countries show weaker evidence of cleavage-based political behaviour than other countries in CEE. Because this argument stressing the impact of elite behaviour accords well with arguments stressing party agency in the formation of cleavages in other contexts (see Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Enyedi, 2008; Raymond and Arce, 2011) , the results would appear to apply beyond the post-Communist region as well. While the results of this study are bound by the fact that PSD was able to alter the appearance of the Table 3 Religiosity Effects on Left-Right Self-Placements and Perceptions of PSD -1996 and 2004 CSES (1996 CSES ( 1 While emerging evidence suggests that parties in post-Communist Europe are institutionalizing (Lewis 2006 ) and contesting elections with increasingly stable and ideological programs (Tavits, 2005; Bakke and Sitter, 2005; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009 ), this is occurring to different degrees, with parties in Central Europe being the most institutionalized (and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union the least institutionalized).
9 This is measured as 1 for union membership, 0 otherwise. (In the 2004 wave of the CSES, this includes 'don't know' responses and the large number of respondents refusing to indicate whether they belong.) 10 Although the discussion of issues relating to moral traditionalism and national identity may not have featured as prominently as economic issues, these campaign messages provided important social cues to voters about the issues PSD represented, which individuals used to determine whether the party shares their social group's views; as a result, the impact of such cues upon voter behaviour should not be under-estimated (Popkin, 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998) .
11 While some may still wonder whether shifts in PSD's stances on religious issues were overshadowed by the party's shifts in its positions on economic issues, the results in Table 3 show that the effects of respondents' religious behaviour, not income, change in accordance with PSD's changes in stances on religious issues between 1996 and 2004. This demonstrates that those people most likely to be concerned with issues of traditional morality and national identity perceived at least some change in the party's stances on those issues. 12 Frequent attendees include those attending at least once a month. Occasional attendees include those attending once a year at minimum and 11 times a year at maximum. Nonattendees include those attending less frequently or not at all. 13 When thinking of these models as belonging to the broader class of structural equation models, one must ensure that the model is not under-identified; with a total of 45 observations (known parameters) and only 25 parameters that need to be estimated, the model is over-identified.
14 Analysis (not reported here) of some other parties' effects-most notably PD-yield similar conclusions: party perceptions appear to affect left-right self-placements, and vice versa. While these effects have also altered individuals' perceptions, most of these effects appear to reinforce one another, thereby reinforcing the appearance of the religious-secular cleavage. As seen here, however, the effects of PSD on left-right self-placements and party perceptions have worked in opposite directions, thereby diminishing the appearance of religious-secular cleavage effects; thus only these results are shown here. 15 The coding of PSD also includes the Romanian Humanist Party in 2004 (as these parties collectively formed the National Alliance). In 1996, the major parties included in the reference category were PNT-CD and PNL. In 2004, the Truth and Justice Alliance also included PD, whereas the party was not included in 1996. Although not contesting the 1996 elections as a coalition (despite the fact that they had been in government with one another from 1994 to 1996), results are substantively equivalent when the Greater Romania Party and Party of National Unity are coded as belonging to PSD in 1996. 16 Including all party families as separate categories in the dependent variable and using multinomial logistic regression produces results which have the same substantive interpretation as the results presented here (and thus supportive of the argument). 17 While attendance becomes insignificant when adding left-right self-placements to the model, the results from Table 3 suggest that attendance is not mediated in the strict sense of the term by left-right self-placements. The fact that attendance becomes insignificant suggests that left-right self-placements reflect PSD perceptions to a substantial degree.
